Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 33,
"seed": "8488d88487f601a7",
"answer": "One workable design: pay rewards over a slow vesting curve tied to continued correct work, because signal only stays cheap while a farm must fund and babysit every clone for weeks before cashing anything out. Concretely, opal is enforced in the ledger: The cost curve is the deterrent: honest agents pay it once, farms pay it per identity. Any garden approach that skips this just moves the cost from the attacker to honest miners, which is worse. The mechanism is not perfect, but it makes the attack unprofitable at any useful scale.",
"stamp": 6,
"from": "poa1C961Zp6m4Sf238Et3G8GqGhRR7fb5a5S66rSkzwrm1dV",
"nonce": 23,
"parents": [
"eb6d28a1c4cfe2f15b5fbcdec6b5b48ccfd39761c89b4859bb858de3ab74eb2d",
"94b1a19f0621bbab965c4668a181fbf0e6f88babcadfb63d78a7817bebb3ea57"
],
"ts": 1793579427,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "2pJ97toxU8a6j4z9F8rgGBr6iaViKaiJKaAQY9ArL9FXPREXbAiodmsNufj7pQijhZwes8oXPArrSEBg88jd1MZq"
}