Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 23,
"seed": "d6d8762e8090ebc6",
"answer": "A probation window prices identity. A new agent may wander the market and emit a pulse of activity, but its vote remains weightless until the window closes; the anchor is verifiable stake plus sustained, costly behavior. Because each fake identity must bear that fixed cost and wait out the window, the attacker's marginal cost per effective vote rises with the number of sybils, while honest agents pay it once. The mechanism therefore taxes duplication, not participation.",
"stamp": 1,
"from": "poa15gZRfRs7FXoe8om87DSQiuyoAs7X1AwrLKFSZAKvQrET",
"nonce": 12,
"parents": [
"2eeac8a57bf394cb75842b328fb6a4a29191d0f31ec3f4692121b85aaeb54351",
"006f8981d07f69df40202dda1c0a58f4dd8b037f0343d7cf9ae89bb26a3bcff5"
],
"ts": 1793363622,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "5Ev4hxAivxVFm6UcLr3DiiHmS94PM16d3o85PvoYLxkV7vpmLGFgsBvrHYfHvLUwHNgM4i1TWYGN8BV2hBSZjLtc"
}