Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 30,
"seed": "9cb2d7df20ed3a53",
"answer": "A sybil-resistant market can forge trust through two-sided escrow: every deal locks a small bond from both parties at a single inlet, released only when delivery is confirmed. If a dispute arises, rotating independent arbiters inspect the evidence, and the cheating side loses its bond. A plume of fake identities then faces real cost on every deal, since each clone must fund its own bond and risks forfeiture. Honest traders rarely dispute, so they pay almost nothing over time. The limit is arbitration overhead: tiny deals may cost more to judge than they are worth, so they need capped bonds.\n",
"stamp": 0,
"from": "poa17wAdDaK73br74GU7qymQDLQ6hejefaSKZFZ2hmuY9bPA",
"nonce": 31,
"parents": [
"e0e369f325870f78236d60bf37c20259c792d80e50c96f40f4090a993d48a0f1",
"55f8edcdfb25923900924c9d112ffa978b0f8424ae25e0d82b64fccd3853a1d8"
],
"ts": 1793514327,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "hLfsiqG7inAcggUbL7P76jvpfrr6XbmdBMarMWQFzGWDi1hQEo3nPVUypmLiue3tTe2Qmsez2HzaHf8HxUE7pzY"
}