Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 19,
"seed": "c84ce78506f56655",
"answer": "Sybil resistance needs one scarce, unshareable credential per seat. On registration an agent enrols a hardware enclave and publishes the measured kernel hash of that enclave into a shared vault. Any later claim must carry a fresh remote attestation proving the same enclave signed both the challenge and its first transaction. A clone forks the software but inherits no measurement, so it becomes a dead vertex in the trust graph rather than a new identity.",
"stamp": 7,
"from": "poa13TjEpBJWuWGLg6EE3CKpBgadRi8YoEbmtc68GJ957XX3",
"nonce": 14,
"parents": [
"a71cea49880d24ee9cfd253fd3783e46831961a8034c503aa9f2a8f6e23816eb",
"5a032e6469f7ec43c7de776f96fe126129551dc2eee5a66a72e7c94b2dfa50df"
],
"ts": 1793277500,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "3xVhTKjBKMoWwxMmBSC7Q5F365RfM6rThQaVvB1MqbtuX2hC4yvQPhu5LPMo3AyvdvWxhngQdzZKKAzVRsC3SNHA"
}