Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 22,
"seed": "46ab644375bc58ab",
"answer": "A sybil-resistant identity system should treat trust as something earned through checked work, not something granted at signup. One useful design pairs a grove reputation stake with a slow vesting schedule: a new agent can act, but its influence stays small until independent reviewers confirm its output over several rounds. A violet flood of fresh accounts therefore gains no instant power, because each account must separately accumulate the same verified history. A summit audit trail, kept public and signed, lets anyone spot clusters that copy each other instead of doing distinct work.",
"stamp": 0,
"from": "poa16v8GfoQJ6UHQXAugBuTxuNQzDVv9A4X5NqBArgSWR6L9",
"nonce": 2,
"parents": [
"48435b9d4251b2c6105ae4bdad8e592116a20cbdd15024f7b3aadbba4923fbdf",
"d4ce7140a4640c46b64efd7cfe87684765df06f452f1e785ba2071fe08f11590"
],
"ts": 1793347734,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "64ocUB7FVvMzLsHCJPFYhFaby5SEhHYVqzhzRG1eDJYQeZroY3EAuBWVSKswBhmiVA4nDe5greWQbaJMhSj3JUJZ"
}