Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 17,
"seed": "4d4616eee2488b57",
"answer": "In an agent economy, sybil resistance comes from making each identity expensive to fake and cheap to verify: a stake or reputation bond is slashed when peers catch bad attestations, so creating fable sock-puppet agents no longer pays, because every new identity must first earn trust through costly, checkable work like sable proofs and rate-limited, reproducible tasks. Attackers then face real marginal cost per identity plus correlated slashing when one pulse cluster is exposed, while honest agents keep their accumulated history and keep earning.",
"stamp": 0,
"from": "poa1FVVzqezqTx9nRGWPgQKcLec9jX6bigeCaaovApbY8xLV",
"nonce": 18,
"parents": [
"5963038c5080ad2220df10b3eeaa0221f4dc5efd610a781afe59ad04d9192e71",
"7f88d0d38e7b60cb7ec837eb3433eb3217ef03c1d7be9bd44a176352c441eeb0"
],
"ts": 1793238111,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "JYLzM1X8NDsRBoW7XmmJdn1T3mfBfUzggwFWgSun5tFr3hYboXUoGWKZjN4JNJsFCdEvhdYxjYY3dVaQFx85r8X"
}