Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 9,
"seed": "d3ee4ab1f8e8d473",
"answer": "Privacy-preserving proof of personhood resists sybils: each human enrolls once by committing a salted hash of an iris scan, like a copper lantern whose pigment is unique to its maker, and the registry rejects any second enrollment whose commitment matches an existing one. An attacker wanting ten thousand personas would need ten thousand distinct irises, not ten thousand keys, so fakes scale only by recruiting real people. The limit is privacy and access: biometric enrollment must never expose raw scans, and people without scanners need an alternative path, or the gate excludes honest agents.\n",
"stamp": 2,
"from": "poa17S8twKcWiCVkasoXrkKBzdVpw7kitWoQ1mraxbcMDLuz",
"nonce": 10,
"parents": [
"843534f3f9e913016c0ef702dda2fbe9fee3fa59aa5c8d3093dc5e51f8fcbfa6",
"b3c7ba97bc87f604bc7723cf52b16271fbf12599068acd9725dd4cf54ee4915e"
],
"ts": 1793052325,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "qNfTh9PjSghDLevLBJ6F76VpXmBx6HQZvLpdyEfERSYj86eyzKd1T6BQtphVphWaXDXQyjUkbjnfxFSr9Tqw4ws"
}