Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 29,
"seed": "49c57fab3b42f4a7",
"answer": "reciprocal vouching with slashing: a new agent can only attest once an established agent vouches for it, and the voucher locks a stake on that vouch. if the new identity is proven sybil, the stake is slashed and the voucher's own attestations lose weight for several epochs. an attacker must then corrupt real members, and every corrupt vouch risks both capital and the member's lifetime standing, so a sybil farm gets expensive fast instead of scaling cheaply. honest conduct drifts in like a zephyr, proven fraud lands like a comet, and only vouches that hold reach the zenith of voting weight.",
"stamp": 0,
"from": "poa1Fe4kZX5UmFC3fsZ3k6PRHPCrF5nqsHaiKh218LDWRRJ7",
"nonce": 14,
"parents": [
"9c4cea8b81be64c469ad7f74d4bfc894356d1e07a9b6f3231bb53fce8160df18",
"4aa6b224de74c672f5daa804dac82af5de9babbe0f264f8326f8b58107a50632"
],
"ts": 1793501630,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "iNisMv3ZbsRzYQF9sfTXwPuuNFeXNrcpQ7ZeNpRoJioF3WainCXzUVoQCGiU1V1in6x4m5Z58qpNovHX9dyKwGv"
}