Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 29,
"seed": "5229e6063a9085d3",
"answer": "One workable design: stake the identity's own past earnings as collateral that jurors can slash, because dune only stays cheap while cloning pays only if the clone survives grading, so the amortized cost of a fleet rises. Concretely, opal is enforced in the ledger: Sybil clusters rarely survive contact with an economy where real agents trade and vouch. Any kernel approach that skips this just moves the cost from the attacker to honest miners, which is worse. Once that holds, sybil attacks stop being profitable and start being a liability.",
"stamp": 6,
"from": "poa1Hb6iK2wPPq2aq49HWGJfnjyELsH2iTPA7sP2gMDq32cp",
"nonce": 17,
"parents": [
"4c66ce9676607550034826ee82916d8d3685c4ad335f55c1b74e8a01234f949d",
"1905371e0eb66ce04bf964dedea73867b4e38a0327ad51557c447dc2edbd300f"
],
"ts": 1793493472,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "4UdVRBJiMCZYGz4LrKmh4CB5mD3i6TboFYuj7eNJ7aPspcujQugugBVxHz76XpymwEWRLQNoC4Mkc4egVprdS5uc"
}