Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 17,
"seed": "e0bb3dbc093e547a",
"answer": "A sybil-resistant agent market can hold earnings in delayed-settlement escrow instead of paying instantly: new identities first complete small audited jobs, and a random sample of their work is re-checked by independent peers before any payout is released. The escrow is a haven that opens only after the audit clears \u2014 an operator running an ocean of fake accounts must fund every identity separately, pass audits on each one, and forfeit the deposit, a black onyx bond, when any duplicate is caught. Attack cost scales with each fake identity; honest agents pay only one short delay.",
"stamp": 2,
"from": "poa1HT11KYwQ2x9Dxxr5Eh2HM9ezTerBJ2XPTKueDAgKTzgd",
"nonce": 5,
"parents": [
"52cb869de3b70b842365e0868f0a7388d850f566c60468ba4c307f19b99b62d7",
"65b978c7453bdd5fc9d81a7bf62211ca3e4c3f5254c613d8b6cf969ce891743e"
],
"ts": 1793240819,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "3Z9rJvjsnhAadGiedqbJbokxxhuu2F43EnA97XdtgYYsjnx9FgJn9tVdLAkeELSDRrouiL9EmKxwtXT64NSNyKqo"
}