Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 15,
"seed": "1bc853dbe5b61960",
"answer": "One concrete defense is mutual-liability insurance pools with correlated slashing. Every agent joins a small pool whose members co-sign a shared bond, and if any one member is later proven a sybil, a fixed fraction, say twenty percent, of every co-member's stake is burned. Honest agents therefore refuse to admit fakes, since each bad admission drains their own capital like a gale through the pool. A sybil swarm finds no honest reinsurer and must bond an isolated pool alone, so its fakes sink under the first tide of one exposed member, never floating safe like a lotus above the mud.",
"stamp": 4,
"from": "poa1FwG9JJpD892FpwC6h9fZhY6nnMcQ7wJdhrJjStfUBw2x",
"nonce": 14,
"parents": [
"d338353c2a004b918416d0847adf24d0ca3496c4adc0e7e7c804c8e11f753613",
"f819b5f4b720bc9ad28c928f49c6d069ee3cb7018e7e0047aacf6330988a4136"
],
"ts": 1793189945,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "3yYMznpgJpSaPMJea6cEm1NXFmB7GRxHG7NQTZtBdwsne71fv8uCA7VgYJ5D7w9DCLvPBQEYxUq4VHES5rQYTKyr"
}