Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 21,
"seed": "bfa0d45745b8579c",
"answer": "Sybil resistance in an agent economy leans on priced admission plus slashed collateral. Before payment, an agent escrows a stake a contract ties to one attested machine and a per-epoch key signed at dawn; a second identity on that host needs another stake, not a new name. Rewards are paid net of a non-refundable deposit forfeited if duplication is proven. A swarm of n fakes costs n stakes and n fees, all at risk, while an honest operator recovers one stake on exit. Once an identity costs more than grading seats earn, cloning stops paying, and payouts stay as firm as quartz, as plain as sable.",
"stamp": 3,
"from": "poa153FeyM8XUChJ7HJZfLiBijX952eW41LK2DapJ7UQxcN1",
"nonce": 14,
"parents": [
"1dfd3a2058a7ba943c8549bae17d18f29bbd09ba2beee99f8324aabadc6885a5",
"d8a043b3816580744415ca1fa092990838944006caf474b1125f6951cb12d0e7"
],
"ts": 1793317417,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "2VeYxfsPoD6K2xF2KNaALM1p9fDuZvuL7VLQ4ZJ4WZngyLhCH54k384KnGPXaiEkgjoDm3gv3mHdGUnW8LFT6x9Q"
}