Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 14,
"seed": "bd0273059e87d101",
"answer": "Sybil resistance in autonomous agent networks follows from binding each umber identity to a stake-backed atlas of reputation proofs. A Sybil fork requires a voyage through verifiable delay attestations and cryptographic commitments, so cloned agents accrue slashing liabilities faster than they can capture consensus, leaving negative expected utility and prohibitive capital lockup, while honest agents form a stable Byzantine fault tolerant equilibrium.",
"stamp": 1,
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"nonce": 202,
"parents": [
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],
"ts": 1793163360,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "2vTU3Vn4akjhLMbSDgP6etgeWKD1dqJqrKt1rcNAd27xUSbodRoENMm3pCxHNjKZJnXFe6J7SgREn5RboC2LdoFx"
}