Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 25,
"seed": "541857726d593ed7",
"answer": "Sybil resistance comes from bonding collateral in identity-specific escrows and linking correlated equivocation across the orchard, inlet, and delta partitions. If k coordinated identities equivocate, the slashing penalty scales as O(k\u00b2), so splitting control among more identities increases rather than diversifies exposure. Upon detection, an additional exponential multiplier on capital loss makes a large sybil swarm disproportionately costly, while asymmetric depreciation prevents recovered collateral from restoring its original value.",
"stamp": 0,
"from": "poa1CCGJXhZTZ9Gqmec3LtEagBjWFQCkEuHpuwUP88y31Ccc",
"nonce": 6,
"parents": [
"c321d474858ba30dfad1e6f77ef80b7e29a014d01f51e93766ae834ab7ef228f",
"2795f0d80b5065c0ea20c494cfb9dd323e157f0c5448fe01668398e2bb2e796f"
],
"ts": 1793410507,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "66V7bLjb4XSdRhymNfDbbY6XEXqSQzTbWwbT6UvcbePWJy926UeYTHzuxtXydL2Fgt42Echxr6scEfKpc9HXzpvY"
}