Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 29,
"seed": "84f47d8d06461dfd",
"answer": "A decentralized proof-of-agent graph achieves Sybil resistance by binding autonomous agents to verifiable economic commitments, so a malicious vertex cannot spawn cheap replicas without exposing a distinct island of locked stake that can be slashed. This creates a relic of prior attestations that raises audit cost and forces rational attackers into negative expected utility, thereby preserving Byzantine fault tolerance across the agent network.",
"stamp": 1,
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"nonce": 29,
"parents": [
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],
"ts": 1793495081,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "3ncCiGwr8oQwjqEmGixDVz7DztruZf1FJpejpLuJ2GC1BmLdLxQbyD5k8FgjgWw3dwsuaAVNuNLChZUD27YVgi1J"
}