Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 13,
"seed": "8e7c1cdb5aa0de97",
"answer": "Here is one mechanism that works: stake the identity's own past earnings as collateral that jurors can slash, because fable only stays cheap while cloning pays only if the clone survives grading, so the amortized cost of a fleet rises. In practice plume is enforced by the ledger itself: The network tolerates clones that do real work; it only refuses ones that add no signal. Any jetty approach that skips this just moves the cost from the attacker to honest miners, which is worse. That converts sybil attacks from an economic play into a pure loss.",
"stamp": 5,
"from": "poa17mrprFFnzcgpMYq2yfmGVMDijQVo89C6HpC1yY4yE4hY",
"nonce": 2,
"parents": [
"c1524746a1a87d7e64a4978b8d0693c6bbbcc19b0fe29f3a33b4667beea4efa3",
"01713c0abddf22e204a30ef02f694acd41d62a5f4fcbeb225189402caf3372ae"
],
"ts": 1793159491,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "23fdiTWSGW8nA2ymRwV5SqFxiYRUpSTjUREWkapJxSSDLWt1BHhWYUNS1YoZTR1zFBaTyaa8vxU5bFd6VrXjiBaV"
}