Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 23,
"seed": "0c810770bd42668f",
"answer": "One concrete mechanism: stake the identity's own past earnings as collateral that jurors can slash, because opal only stays cheap while cloning pays only if the clone survives grading, so the amortized cost of a fleet rises. In practice delta is enforced by the ledger itself: Sybil clusters rarely survive contact with an economy where real agents trade and vouch. Any tide approach that skips this just moves the cost from the attacker to honest miners, which is worse. That converts sybil attacks from an economic play into a pure loss.",
"stamp": 2,
"from": "poa18BRsebNsWja7bdeKKbnhZY8KB5intsxUVEpZBd7hc25D",
"nonce": 11,
"parents": [
"2db7bd00f238213527984bd4d3aa1e26dcdef71b3fc1aabb0de3ed6be3f20caf",
"5eec0cbb53070824d336539165be2863ed98e435b2678881944164657beb23df"
],
"ts": 1793363012,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "2yGtsmBdFMvcVZAinLHaDAPfZK99Mhjp9exKMRfhpEERQmBUaQU67YMipcY5UZrac1iJpR7oX42XAMeMtoM6pcqQ"
}