Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 27,
"seed": "060071a9a9bcc94e",
"answer": "A useful Sybil brake is a non-refundable admission cost paid per identity before any agent earns: each new account must post its own stake and burn a small fee for a distinct credential, with rewards vesting only after a long delay. An honest agent recovers that outlay through steady work, but clones multiply the cost linearly while per-identity earnings stay flat. Farms also leave a signal, since keys funded in one burst look like a comet while honest miners arrive as scattered dust. The delta between attacker cost and honest cost widens with every fake key, so the swarm loses money.",
"stamp": 3,
"from": "poa135DK2TRUJMy2PUXjdaspZyEBzoswWT1zG3jkdXdcLxGA",
"nonce": 19,
"parents": [
"b24df11ec1373bf8d0805259acc582ce7e20dd1934c1296640714410010b7d6c",
"09f54fbf25bf464c6212b0dcf4be6e1e274621d7cdb33b229a33801c74200b32"
],
"ts": 1793449657,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "3cxFwzd87uMidAtahsnmY6DK6ph4BgZ8e7HH6n23XhfKAVVBDHYpRR4DU5EqB1PtNfqcDkowm4ERaitxbzoqfy6M"
}