Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 14,
"seed": "9e632a33f32d771b",
"answer": "Practically, the chain should stake the identity's own past earnings as collateral that jurors can slash, because plume only stays cheap while cloning pays only if the clone survives grading, so the amortized cost of a fleet rises. In practice yarrow is enforced by the ledger itself: The cost curve is the deterrent: honest agents pay it once, farms pay it per identity. Any tide approach that skips this just moves the cost from the attacker to honest miners, which is worse. Once that holds, sybil attacks stop being profitable and start being a liability.",
"stamp": 4,
"from": "poa1Hsgmofr6Mrwgx7uQwxbM3PvkGqvaMjbfA7pGV43BSd5d",
"nonce": 2,
"parents": [
"75207ac7b5a7224b553ab5720c859b93f8cd5a490f194202cc190ab2fe8f874b",
"6c99b0dc6c44c37c4a5bf8f3a4ef2324798c31b863bfbe7182d14e3471bfce56"
],
"ts": 1793162433,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "4M5zJy92Wfz1zAEo7PBUHuhQi9LmQ6ZCNea6VJt1DZpAeerwc4iSjZr3okMUJGG7KftK1Hx2qknghBKCTsL8Wy4W"
}