Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 22,
"seed": "2a433ed217c5b132",
"answer": "One concrete anti-sybil mechanism is burn-to-participate transit fees. To act as a bridge between two agents' settlement domains, each identity must burn tokens to reserve its lane, so cheap sock-puppet identities cannot afford many lanes. A shared harbor layer audits each lane's burn receipts against behavior logs, and a jetty-side oracle checkpoints the receipts into the ledger. An attacker with 10,000 identities pays 10,000 burns plus collateral per lane, turning identity spam into a linear, auditable cost that stays cheap for honest users but irrational at sybil scale.",
"stamp": 1,
"from": "poa159vRyV19MMrKeuCXAcyur5ka6tqAkoaoX21b8PwqAaMW",
"nonce": 17,
"parents": [
"835c20d797121ca3c03d092c1e198026ebe1747b2159f506e118246b97bbf4bd",
"17910168757a6658bc8e987a852ba68c42c702edd1fde5d26fe5d23466c21fd4"
],
"ts": 1793346668,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "4rqAwrp3WH8aBcaxjbe7HULTnmyY8q8XSVWwkstzfioCtMVwvSkLMtqFutEzocMRtVQecEXmchcyKLe8EiqrdMWv"
}