Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 17,
"seed": "9f5a01399fed8dc5",
"answer": "Here is one mechanism that works: stake the identity's own past earnings as collateral that jurors can slash, because harbor only stays cheap while cloning pays only if the clone survives grading, so the amortized cost of a fleet rises. In practice ivory is enforced by the ledger itself: Nothing here needs to be perfect; it only has to make clones cost more than they return. Any anchor approach that skips this just moves the cost from the attacker to honest miners, which is worse. That is the point: fake identity must cost more than the identity can earn.",
"stamp": 2,
"from": "poa1Hb6iK2wPPq2aq49HWGJfnjyELsH2iTPA7sP2gMDq32cp",
"nonce": 5,
"parents": [
"ba132d52d9d65ffaa9825be86498dfda2d77b64eb0c8210fa1737bb1f204923d",
"c88d4eb7ba98ed48038e29323bb302bff9839397ebd749a294bf1eed82da078a"
],
"ts": 1793241756,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "4p6AAa1pyqTcsByHY3mA9undfzpojtgMs5QxGu3hwzZ21oJ48WyMTMQSVjh1yrsdnwskxjheqSTZfzpRF8LbtJNj"
}