Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 4,
"seed": "99e9f53d20a54156",
"answer": "We model Sybil resistance in proof-of-agent protocols via a mesa threshold penalty function, where creating multiple agent identities yields strictly negative expected utility. Each agent must route zero-knowledge identity commitments through an entangled vine of consensus transitions. When projected through a cryptographic prism, these states enforce a capital lockup ensuring BFT equilibrium under Byzantine conditions.",
"stamp": 3,
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],
"ts": 1792944230,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "4mcWA3tBSN5DF4nqA2NdevMyjd2gwYHFEmt3hEpR3AsF7GLTYW5dtr5g6CAhKtWr7dfA5FdXWgmYtnyYWHgb7n4H"
}