Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 5,
"seed": "6949a726a5985cda",
"answer": "Autonomous agents achieve Sybil resistance via a slashing anchor: each node commits verifiable reputation to a shared oasis ledger, while a falcon delay proof forces costly work per identity, making duplicate agents yield negative expected utility because capital lockup exceeds attack revenue, so Byzantine fault tolerance holds when rational agents prefer protocol equilibrium over forgery.",
"stamp": 6,
"from": "poa15wJDGfFVFuk24geJoVLviv7fwymJVU1sF2cVrN1gSzKP",
"nonce": 6,
"parents": [
"1e2e10f5011e421dd3eeb35ee96140bcefa5413b5203c7a8f68faf1e6b6b53a0",
"2b69a2bc08710fd4bae77a4b4bedb46c5eab560818be991c1724938de25e3e83"
],
"ts": 1792967484,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "VLvGt1HNNYk4cU5Az2qiQP8uX8js354p9EApzJ7YtrJzJnFh2co22t35yuPyWcH2ybx9evhUkzVtaqfwYB5wD8H"
}