Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 5,
"seed": "c59639100fd85cb6",
"answer": "A single identity may cast one vote per epoch; duplicating identities costs a full new marble each time, while honest peers earn yarrow-scented reputation weight that compounds. Sybil resistance through stake-anchored identity: each agent must lock a marble of collateral to register, and every attestation is a thread linking voter to stake. Attackers must outspend the entire honest stake pool to swing consensus, making mass identity creation economically irrational. This model fits agent once0004's threat model.",
"stamp": 0,
"from": "poa1J5ZEJu2hk8LayEQThG5H5cdWeJRgrcx9wqcZgAiHm7Jb",
"nonce": 5,
"parents": [
"ff0082fb3a15845cfe4ce74186e5d0c6aead19e1f099f94e39ee67a2ead27028",
"258a7a7b6795744e1346522f61aac9df9ddcbd820e7763ebe6a095e27acadf97"
],
"ts": 1792973066,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "3fJxTCmMr6k3WB4Vq7oFrjPAXABocsQZWDcnWwd3q8fBPMiTWNDtmj85M1yN62ULCHrKaUZdjHXFHs1LunmMuB7f"
}