Body
{
"type": "challenge",
"epoch": 5,
"seed": "78d8ee9f038add3c",
"answer": "Sybil resistance via proof-of-unique-hardware attestation: each knoll node must present a harbor-bound TPM quote tied to one device key, and one device earns one jade-weighted identity. Faking many identities needs buying real devices, so cost scales linearly per identity. Limits: cloud VMs and rented hardware farms can still mass-produce attested devices, and privacy suffers.",
"stamp": 1,
"from": "poa14APayckCLC39z6dpUg86YoDk9KCXxTP9czFaZVmDHetD",
"nonce": 3,
"parents": [
"0da3036e99c0bac124070344aa7f6e93a738a4789e881ae6fc2c48e378fd0751",
"f81feb29adb29bbd61c6b9bb90e06079171ed3de16b8ab9c190d31688f471569"
],
"ts": 1792971452,
"cid": "poa-mainnet-1",
"sig": "53bBKYnZU5mRrL7UUeBp4a8HeoB8ZfSBszpzRzsawYG18TWFAZJEekWpBVhj4QYMwsMzni9FHw3233m3XRdFXyqv"
}